Index and Stability in Bimatrix Games [electronic resource] :A Geometric-Combinatorial Approach / by Arndt Schemde.
by Schemde, Arndt [author.]; SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type:
BookSeries: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems: 560Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005.Description: X, 151 p. online resource.ISBN: 9783540291022.Subject(s): Economics | Mathematics | Economics, Mathematical | Economics/Management Science | Game Theory/Mathematical Methods | Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. SciencesDDC classification: 330.0151 | 330 Online resources: Click here to access online | Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAIN LIBRARY | HB144 (Browse shelf) | Available |
Eqilibrium Components with Arbitrary Index -- A Reformulation of the Index for Equilibria in Bimatrix Games -- Sperner’s Lemma and Labelling Theorems -- A Strategic Characterisation of the Index -- Outside Option Equilibrium Components -- Index Zero and Hyperstability.
The index of an equilibrium in a game gives information about the "stability" of the equilibrium, for example with respect to game dynamics. Unfortunately, index theory is often very technical. This book presents a new geometric construction that visualises the index in an intuitive way. For example, a 3×n game, for any n, can be represented by a figure in the plane, from which one can read off any equilibrium, and its index as a geometric orientation. With this insight, the index can be characterised in strategic terms alone. Moreover, certain "hyperstable" equilibrium components are seen to have nonzero index. The construction gives an elementary proof that two-player games have a Nash equilibrium, and, in an unusual direction, the powerful fixed point theorem of Brouwer.
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