Models in Cooperative Game Theory [electronic resource] /by Rodica Branzei, Dinko Dimitrov, Stef Tijs.
by Branzei, Rodica [author.]; Dimitrov, Dinko [author.]; Tijs, Stef [author.]; SpringerLink (Online service).
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BookPublisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.Edition: Second Edition.Description: XII, 203p. online resource.ISBN: 9783540779544.Subject(s): Economics | Mathematics | Operations research | Microeconomics | Economics, Mathematical | Economics/Management Science | Game Theory/Mathematical Methods | Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences | Operations Research/Decision Theory | Microeconomics | Operations Research, Mathematical ProgrammingDDC classification: 330.0151 | 330 Online resources: Click here to access online | Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAIN LIBRARY | HB144 (Browse shelf) | Available |
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Cooperative Games with Crisp Coalitions -- Preliminaries -- Cores and Related Solution Concepts -- The Shapley Value, the ?-value, and the Average Lexicographic Value -- Egalitarianism-based Solution Concepts -- Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games -- Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions -- Preliminaries -- Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games -- Convex Fuzzy Games -- Fuzzy Clan Games -- Multi-Choice Games -- Preliminaries -- Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games -- Classes of Multi-Choice Games.
This book investigates models in cooperative game theory in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially. In a crisp game the agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game players are allowed to cooperate with infinite many different participation levels, varying from non-cooperation to full cooperation. A multi-choice game describes the intermediate case in which each player may have a fixed number of activity levels. Different set and one-point solution concepts for these games are presented. The properties of these solution concepts and their interrelations on several classes of crisp, fuzzy, and multi-choice games are studied. Applications of the investigated models to many economic situations are indicated as well. The second edition is highly enlarged and contains new results and additional sections in the different chapters as well as one new chapter.
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