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Strategic Social Choice [electronic resource] :Stable Representations of Constitutions / by Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters.

by Peleg, Bezalel [author.]; Peters, Hans [author.]; SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: Studies in Choice and Welfare: Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.Description: XVIII, 154 p. online resource.ISBN: 9783642138751.Subject(s): Economics | Mathematics | Economics, Mathematical | Social sciences -- Methodology | Economics/Management Science | Game Theory/Mathematical Methods | Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences | Economic Theory | Methodology of the Social SciencesDDC classification: 330.0151 | 330 Online resources: Click here to access online
Contents:
Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting -- to Part II -- Feasible elimination procedures -- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions -- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.
In: Springer eBooksSummary: This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
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Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting -- to Part II -- Feasible elimination procedures -- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions -- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.

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