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The Moral Wager [electronic resource] :Evolution and Contract / by Malcolm Murray.

by Murray, Malcolm [author.]; SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: Philosophical Studies Series: 108Publisher: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2007.Description: IX, 241p. online resource.ISBN: 9781402058554.Subject(s): Philosophy (General) | Ethics | Evolution (Biology) | Mathematics | Philosophy | Ethics | Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences | Evolutionary Biology | PhilosophyDDC classification: 170 Online resources: Click here to access online
Contents:
Irrealism -- Against Moral Categoricity -- Self-Interest -- Rationality’s Failure -- Evolutionary Fit -- Consent Theory -- Concerned Parties -- Suffering and Indifference.
In: Springer eBooksSummary: This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutionary games operate as if following this piece of normative advice: Don't do unto others without their consent. From this advice, some significant implications for moral theory follow. First, we cannot view morality as a categorical imperative. Secondly, we cannot hope to offer rational justification for adopting moral advice. This is where Glaucon and Adeimantus went astray: they wanted a proof of the benefits of morality in every single case. That is not possible. Moral constraint is a bad bet taken in and of itself. But there is some good news: moral constraint is a good bet when examined statistically.
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Irrealism -- Against Moral Categoricity -- Self-Interest -- Rationality’s Failure -- Evolutionary Fit -- Consent Theory -- Concerned Parties -- Suffering and Indifference.

This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutionary games operate as if following this piece of normative advice: Don't do unto others without their consent. From this advice, some significant implications for moral theory follow. First, we cannot view morality as a categorical imperative. Secondly, we cannot hope to offer rational justification for adopting moral advice. This is where Glaucon and Adeimantus went astray: they wanted a proof of the benefits of morality in every single case. That is not possible. Moral constraint is a bad bet taken in and of itself. But there is some good news: moral constraint is a good bet when examined statistically.

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